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FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH' THE STATES.

Price: $4.00.

As always in time of war, the federal government is today increasing
in power and activity. It is, therefore, well to be reminded at this period
of the country's history that the force of legislation by Congress using
the interstate commerce power to supplement and bulwark state legislation has not yet spent itself. The volume at hand is a clear and thorough
exploration of the development of the legislation and practice by which
Congress has extended state power in relation to commerce and has incorporated state laws by reference into the system of federal regulation of
commerce. In other words, the author has analyzed federal-state cooperative legislation under the commerce clause and has studied the judicial
reasons by which such legislation has been sustained. His focus and
plan are entirely clear and well defined, for he deals exclusively with
federal support of state legislation and makes no attempt to deal with the
general constitutional problems of intergovernmental cooperation or of
state support of federal legislation save as they concern his main theme.
His attention is fixed on problems of constitutional power and not on
evaluation of policies or of federal-state administrative cooperation. The
volume has the virtues and vices of such a plan in that the exposition is
clear, logical and well-defined but gives only the bare bones of the constitutional skeleton without administrative flesh and blood.
In orderly and well-planned fashion, the volume traces the theory of
exclusiveness of the commerce power, and then turns to three excellent
chapters on the formula of the Wilson Act and the effect of the application
of that formula on state power. The author well realizes that the importance of the Wilson Act and of its logical successor, the Webb-Kenyon
Act, cannot be overemphasized in any discussion of American constitutional theory. The two best constructed chapters of the whole excellent
volume are those on federal protection of commerce for the aid of both
shipping and receiving states. Mr. Kallenbach is entirely clear in his
realization that the use of the federal commerce power to uphold and
strengthen the laws of states of origin and destination in the shipment of
goods in interstate commerce is so important that it is "the culmination
of the development of federal cooperation with the states through the commerce power". Despite its importance, and its possibilities for future
development, there are limitations to its usefulness at least on the administrative side, and the author realizes that federal regulation secured
merely by supplementing state laws would be an utter impossibility in
this era of close intercorfmunication throughout the country and the world.
Such regulation, he well states, "would lead to legislative chaos destructive
to the nation's commerce".
It is never within the province of a reviewer to criticize an author
for omission of that which he makes no attempt to discuss as long as he
deals competently with those subjects which lie within his field of choice.
The volume deliberately states that it will omit discussion of federal-state
administrative cooperation. In this field, however, the constitutional
framework is so closely related to administrative possibilities that the
author in his treatment of the conditional-prohibition form of federal regulation under the Ashurst-Sumners Act trespasses on his own forbidden
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territory and takes up the difficulties of inspection and border patrol of
the states which Congress is attempting to protect by the use of this device.
Although the book is entirely correct in its realization that the administration of this form of conditional federal regulation is infinitely more
complicated than the administration of uniform direct federal regulation,
discussion is not given to the administrative difficulties to make the point
with entire clarity. Mr. Kallenbach is on the horns of the dilemma of those
who try to separate constitutional and administrative problems into too
thoroughly watertight compartments.
Much of the volume was evidently written before the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,
3 2 U. S. 100 (1941), which in so many words reversed the famous--or
infamous-decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (i918), as
the Darby decision is discussed only in footnotes. Therefore the assault
of the Ashurst-Sumners Act on the principle of Hammer v. Dagenhart
is, as the author realizes, less important than formerly, for the way is now
open for more direct federal legislation in the commerce field.
The summary and conclusions are excellent in their realism as well
as their sense of direction. Mr. Kallenbach is aware that "the rulings of
the Court have often been supported by language which confuses rather
than clarifies", but that these rulings have been concerned solely with the
production of a uniform result, namely, "the protection of essential national
and local interests without undue restriction upon either state or federal
legislative authority." The author believes that cooperative regulation will
ordinarily be resorted to as a means of reaching only those matters that
Congress is unable to reach by direct federal regulation. Is it not also
possible that cooperative regulation may be used in fields where uniformity
is not desirable throughout the country, but where existing state standards
need more protection than the individual state can give? The last word
has not yet been said on the effect of the cooperative effort, on the constitutional theory of American federalism. It is in this field that the conclusions leave most to be desired.
The type and format are worthy of an excellent and well-organized
volume.
Jane Perry Clark Carey.t
By
George E. Folk. Harper and
PROGRE-S.
PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL
Bros., New York, 1942.
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In 1938 Congress created the Temporary National Economic Committee to make a study of the concentration of economic power and financial
control over production and distribution of goods. It was to consist of
three senators, three representatives and one member from each of six
government departments. This committee set up agencies to study particular problems and itself held numerous hearings over a period of
eighteen months. Eventually it made public its conclusions and published
the various monographs. Monagraph number 31, i79 pages long, related
to "Patents and Free Enterprise" and was written by Walton Hamilton.
The contention of that monograph is that the control of invention through
patented monopolies has resulted in a socially harmful concentration of
economic power. In the highly literary verbiage of Mr. Hamilton,
"Long ago law joined policy to decree that no man is to exploit
his wealth in such a way as to create a scarcity, make for a lower
standard of life, or drive a barrier between a people and their ret Professor of Government, Barnard College.
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. . The imprisonment of invention and production spells

doom; the nation which discovers how to release to mankind the great
storehouse of creative energy shall inherit the earth."
To promote this release, to prevent the artificial creation of scarcity,
Mr. Hamilton's idea about inventions-whatever he may think about pigs
and wheat-is that the patentee must be compelled to permit use of his
invention by others and that he must not be permitted to place any conditions, other than the payment of a reasonable royalty, upon such
authorization.
That monograph is not an exposition and analysis of the evidence
presented to the Committee, nor is it a statement by the Committee of
its own views. It is merely a study made by Mr. Hamilton at the Committee's request and an assertion of his own views. But because of that
study, or of the evidence, or of both, the Committee eventually recommended these changes in the law:
"That the Congress enact legislation which will require that any
future patent is to be available for use by anyone who may desire its
use and who is willing to pay a fair price for the privilege."
"That the owner of any patent be required to grant only unrestricted licenses . .' . should not be permitted to restrict a licensee

in respect of the amount of any article he may produce, the price at
which he may sell, the purpose for which or the manner in which he
may use the patent or any article produced thereunder, or the geographical area within which he may produce or sell such article .... "
With these recommendations and with the Hamilton thesis leading
toward them Mr. Folk takes vigorous issue. He, unlike Hamilton, sets
out the testimony before the Committee and undertakes to evaluate it.
He deals specifically with "the case presented by the Department of Justice", "the case presented by the Department of Commerce", "factual data
supplied by the commissioner of patents", and other basic matters of actuality, or assumed actuality. Against this background he discusses, and
criticizes, the various recommendations of the Committee. He points out
occasional inaccuracies in the others' use of legal terms, and, as a matter
of fact, it is evident to any trained reader that the Committee commits the
sin of using "patent" indiscriminately to connote the patent proper, the
monopoly created by the patent, the invention covered by the patent, and
a tangible embodiment of the invention. Certainly whoever wrote the
Committee's recommendations was not a patent lawyer. But, aside from
minor matters of verbiage, Mr. Folk's criticism goes to the very substance
of the recommendatiois. Nor does he hesitate to speak forthrightly in
his attack.
"Why", he says, "did the Committee recommend for legislation, as
'approved without objection', the proposal of the Department of Justice
with respect to restrictions on the licensing of patents? Undoubtedly it
was because the Committee was led, or rather was misled, into believing
that the alleged control exercised by a so-called 'typical industry' was due
to the fact that it made it a practice to issue such 'restricted' licenses. . ..
The question then arises as to why the Assistant Attorney General misled
the Committee on a subject entrusted to his care and guidance. Granting
his sincerity, then his ignorance of patents and the patent system must be
assumed; and 'unenlightened sincerity is dangerous'." 1
i. Page 321.
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This reviewer does not wholly agree with the implications of Folk's
statement concerning Hamilton, that "Unquestionably the views he advocates could best be advanced by one unhampered by any considerable
knowledge of the subject." 2 Nevertheless when the reviewer read the
Hamilton monograph, though he was tempted toward persuasion by the
force of its literary style and rhetorical flourish, he had the distinct feeling
that its author had adopted a premise without supporting evidence and
was asserting the conclusions to be drawn therefrom rather than demonstrating the truth of the premise. Hence the reviewer was predisposed to
look with favor upon the Folk repudiation of those conclusions. But at
any rate, it is strongly recommended that Mr. Folk's book be read before
the conclusions of the Hamilton monograph or the recommendations of the
Committee are accepted.
John Barker Waite.t
2. Page 78.

t Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.

